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Abstract. With the evolution of the Internet from a controlled research network 
to a worldwide social and economic platform, the initial assumptions regarding 
stakeholder cooperative behavior are no longer valid. Conflicts have emerged in 
situations where there are opposing interests. Previous work in the literature has 
termed these conflicts tussles. This article presents the research of the SESERV 
project, which develops a methodology to investigate such tussles and is carry-
ing out a survey of tussles identified within the research projects funded under 
the Future Networks topic of the FP7. Selected tussles covering both social and 
economic aspects are analyzed also in this article. 
Keywords: Future Internet Socio-Economics, Incentives, Design Principles, 
Tussles, Methodology 
1 Introduction 
The Internet has already long since moved from the original research-driven network 
of networks into a highly innovative, highly competitive marketplace for applications, 
services, and content. Accordingly, different stakeholders in the Internet space have 
developed a wide range of on-line business models to enable sustainable electronic 
business. Furthermore, the Internet is increasingly pervading society [3]. Wide-spread 
access to the Internet via mobile devices, an ever-growing number of broadband users 
world-wide, lower entry barriers for non-technical users to become content and ser-
vice providers, and trends like the Internet-of-Things or the success of Cloud services, 
all provide indicators of the high significance of the Internet today. Hence, social and 
economic impacts of innovations in the future Internet space can be reasonably ex-
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pected to increase in importance. Thus, since the future Internet can be expected to be 
characterized by an ever larger socio-economic impact, a thorough investigation into 
socio-economic tussle analysis becomes highly critical [9]. 
The term tussle was introduced by Clark et al. [5] as a process reflecting the com-
petitive behavior of different stakeholders involved in building and using the Internet. 
That is, a tussle is a process in which each stakeholder has particular self-interests, but 
which are in conflict with the self-interests of other stakeholders. Following these 
interests results in actions – and inter-actions between and among stakeholders. When 
stakeholder interests conflict, inter-actions usually lead to contention. Reasons for 
tussles to arise are manifold. Overlay traffic management and routing decisions be-
tween autonomous systems [11] and mobile network convergence [10] constitute only 
two representative examples for typical tussle spaces. 
The main argument for focusing on tussles in relation to socio-economic impact of 
the future Internet is in the number of observed stakeholders in the current Internet 
and their interests. Clark et al. speak of tussles on the Internet as of today. They argue 
[5] that “[t]here are, and have been for some time, important and powerful players 
that make up the Internet milieu with interests directly at odds with each other.” With 
the ongoing success of the Internet and with the assumption of a future Internet being 
a competitive marketplace with a growing number of both users and service provid-
ers, tussle analysis becomes an important approach to assess the impact of stakeholder 
behavior. 
This paper proposes a generic methodology for identifying and assessing socio-
economic tussles in highly-dynamic and large systems, such as the current and future 
Internet. In order to help an analyst during the tussle identification task, the approach 
presented here provides several examples of tussles, together with their mappings to 
four abstract tussle patterns. Furthermore, a survey of tussles is also presented and the 
way those have been addressed by several FP7 projects.  
SSM (Soft Systems Methodology) proposed by Checkland [4] and CRAMM 
(CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method) [7] have similar objectives to our 
methodology. The former, which is extensively used when introducing new informa-
tion systems into organizations, suggests an iterative approach to studying complex 
and problematic real-world situations (called systems) and evaluating candidate solu-
tions. The latter approach aims at identifying and quantifying security risks in organi-
zations. The situations analyzed by the aforementioned methodologies are often asso-
ciated with certain kinds of tussles. However are quite restrictive in the way evalua-
tion of situations is performed, suggesting specific qualitative methods. On the other 
hand, the proposed tussle analysis methodology provides a higher-level approach 
allowing and/or complementing the application of a wide range of techniques (both 
qualitative and quantitative). For example, microeconomic analysis can be applied, 
which uses mathematical models aiming to understand the behavior of single agents, 
as part of a community, who selfishly seek to maximize some quantifiable measure of 
well-being, subject to restrictions imposed by the environment and the actions of 
others [6]. Similarly, game-theoretic models that aim at finding and evaluating all 
possible equilibrium outcomes when a set of interdependent decision makers interact 
with each other is another candidate method. In this way, one can derive what the 
possible equilibrium points are, under what circumstances these are reached, and 
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compare different protocols and the tussles enabled thereby with respect to a common 
metric. Such a metric can be social welfare or the “Price of Anarchy” [12], i.e., the 
ratio of the worst case Nash equilibrium to the social optimum. 
The remaining of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
proposed methodology for identifying and analyzing socio-economic tussles in the 
Future Internet. In Section 3 we provide a classification of tussles according to stake-
holders’ interests into social and economic ones, which can be used as a reference 
point when applying this methodology. In Section 4 we provide examples of existing 
and potential tussles being studied by several FP7 research projects and we conclude 
in Section 5 by outlining our future work. 
2 A Methodology for Identifying and Assessing Tussles 
The Design for Tussle goal is considered to be a normal evolution of Internet design 
goals to reflect the changes in Internet usage. This paradigm shift should be reflected 
in new attempts for building the Future Internet. However, identifying both existing 
and future socio-economic tussles, understanding their relationship, assessing their 
importance and making informed technical decisions can be very complicated and 
costly, requiring a multi-disciplinary approach to grasp the potential benefits and 
consequences.  
Providing a systematic approach for this task has received little attention by Future 
Internet researchers. Such a methodology should be a step-by-step procedure that can 
be applied to any Internet functionality, acting as a guide for making sure that all 
important factors are considered when making technology decisions. This would 
support policy-makers (such as standardization bodies) to prepare their agenda by 
addressing critical issues first, or protocol designers so that functionality is future-
proof. For example the latter could apply this methodology before and after protocol 
introduction in order to estimate the adoptability and other possible effects, both posi-
tive and negative ones, for the Future Internet. 
The proposed methodology is composed of three steps and can be executed recur-
sively, allowing for more stakeholders, tussles, etc. to be included in the analysis. It is 
out of the article’s scope to suggest where the borderline for the analysis should be 
drawn, as this choice depends on subjective factors like the goals of the analysts and 
their views on the criticality of each research issue. Nevertheless, this requires all 
steps of the methodology to be performed in a justifiable way; following a code of 
research ethics (e.g. assumptions should be realistic and agreed by all team members). 
It is also important to note that for each step of this procedure many techniques could 
be available for completing this task, but not all of them may be perfectly suitable. A 
multidisciplinary team, composed of engineers, economists and social scientists, 
would allow for suggesting candidate techniques and incorporating useful insights 
from different domains at each step of the methodology.  
The proposed methodology is the following: 
1. Identify all primary stakeholders and their properties for the functionality under 
investigation.  
2. Identify tussles among identified stakeholders and their relationship. 
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3. For each tussle: 
a. Assess the impact to each stakeholder; 
b.  Identify potential ways to circumvent and resulting spill-overs. For each new 
circumventing technique, apply the methodology again. 
The first step of the methodology suggests identifying and studying the properties of 
all important stakeholders affected by a functionality related to a protocol, a service, 
or an application instance. The outcome of this step is a set of stakeholders and attrib-
utes such as their population, social context (age, entity type, etc.), technology literacy 
and expectations, openness to risk and innovation. Furthermore, it should be studied 
whether and how these attributes, as well as the relative influence across stakeholders, 
change over time. 
The next step aims at identifying conflicts among the set of stakeholders and their re-
lationship. In performing the first part of this step the analyst could find particularly 
useful to check whether any tussle pattern described in the next section can be instanti-
ated. After the identification task the analyst should check for potential dependencies 
among the tussles, which can be useful in understanding how these are interrelated (for 
example are some of them orthogonal, or have a cause-and-effect relationship?). 
The third step of the methodology proposes to estimate the impact of each tussle 
from the perspective of each stakeholder. In the ideal scenario a tussle outcome will 
affect all stakeholders in a non-negative way and no one will seek to deviate; thus an 
equilibrium point has been reached. Usually this is a result of balanced control across 
stakeholders, which means that the protocols implementing this functionality follow 
the Design for Choice design principle [5]. Such protocols allow for conflict resolu-
tion at run-time, when the technology under investigation is being used. However 
there will be cases where some – or all – stakeholders are not satisfied by the tussle 
outcome and have the incentive to take advantage of the functionality provided, or 
employ other functionalities (protocols/tricks) to increase their socio-economic wel-
fare triggering a tussle spill-over. Tussle spill-overs can have unpredictable effects 
and are considered to be a sign of flawed architectural design [9]. If a tussle spill-over 
can occur then another iteration of the methodology should be performed for the ena-
bling functionality, broadening the scope of the analysis. 
Of course, one difficult aspect to these approaches is acquiring the empirical evi-
dence from which one can draw inferences about stakeholders and tussles. For all steps 
of this methodology except for 3a, system modeling by using use-case scenarios and 
questionnaires would be the most straightforward way to go. However, in complex 
systems with multiple stakeholders, multiple quantitative and qualitative sources of 
evidence may be required to better understand the actual and potential tussles. Thus, one 
can think of the tussle approach outlined here as just one of a set of tools necessary to 
identify, clarify, and help in resolving existing and emergent tussles. For instance, im-
pact assessment (3a) could be performed by mathematical models for assessing risk or 
utility, as well as providing benchmarks like the price of anarchy ratio. Ideally a single 
metric should be used so that results for each tussle are comparable. Note that the as-
sessment of each side-effect (step 3b) is performed in the next iteration.  
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In the following the methodology above is applied in case of congestion control 
with TCP, assuming the analyst stops at the third iteration. 
In the first iteration, congestion control mainly affects heavy users (HUs), interac-
tive users (IUs) and ISPs. Two tussles have been identified, which are closely related: 
(a) contention among HUs and IUs for bandwidth on congested links and (b) conten-
tion among ISPs and HUs since the aggressive behavior of the latter has a negative 
effect on IUs and provision of other services. Assuming that the ISP’s network re-
mains the same, control in both tussles is considered biased. An IU gets K1 bps by 
opening a single TCP connection, while an HU opens N TCP connections and gets K2 
bps (where K1<<K2), regardless of their utility on instantaneous bandwidth. Simi-
larly, only a HU controls how many TCP connections will be active, since the ISP has 
no means to correlate connections with applications. In order to assess the impact of 
the first tussle, an analyst could measure social welfare loss or calculate the price of 
anarchy ratio, noticing that the latter can be very large due to starvation of IUs. On the 
other hand, risk assessment techniques seem more relevant for the second tussle since 
high congestion can have an impact on ISP’s plans to offer other real-time services. 
Identifying possible spill-over effects for the tussle among HUs and IUs it can be 
mentioned that the possibility for developers of interactive applications or ASPs (Ap-
plication Service Providers) to adopt more aggressive techniques, resulting in greater 
contention. In the second tussle, an ISP could employ middle-boxes and perform 
traffic shaping based on port number, which has a negative impact on QoS-aware 
applications of third-party ASPs. 
In the second iteration the focus laid will be on the network neutrality issue that is 
considered a side-effect of traffic-shaping (but not the only reason). In this case, the 
set of stakeholders is extended to include ASPs as well. The new tussle involves ISPs 
and ASPs (e.g. VoIP providers), since the traffic of the latter is being throttled by 
middle-boxes (either on purpose or not). Again, control is imbalanced; only ISPs can 
configure the middle-boxes since there is no API (Application Programming Inter-
face) for ASPs to affect how their traffic will be handled. ASPs and HUs can employ 
protocol obfuscation techniques and ISPs can reply by more aggressive traffic shap-
ing, resulting in an endless arms’ race. Risk assessment techniques could be used in 
this case, as well as models for estimating social welfare loss. A side-effect of this 
tussle is innovation discouragement since new applications are harder to become 
widely known, which may result in regulatory intervention. 
In the third iteration it will be assumed that the policy-maker (a new stakeholder) 
decides to intervene, with the important advantage of proactively seeking the socially 
optimum solution. The regulator’s decision will redistribute control across stake-
holders in a balanced way or, in more complex cases, cause new tussles to arise. Since 
future tussles depend on the regulator’s action and the possible set of actions can be 
large, the regulator should perform an iteration of the methodology for each scenario. 
Then the policy-maker should select the action with the most favorable properties.  In 
practice, of course, other factors will often intercede and result in actors making less 
than perfectly rational decisions, but it will be assumed for the sake of argument that 
the actors are seeking optimum solutions. 
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3 Taxonomy of Socio-economic Tussles  
Many articles have been published building on Clark’s work as applied to specific 
technical domains [12,13]. However, the extensive range of tussles to be addressed 
and analyzed by SESERV requires a classification framework for tussles based on 
abstract tussle patterns. 
On the left part of Figure 1 we see a general model for a single tussle. In the model, 
agents have resources that are used to realize their interests. A tussle occurs when two 
agents have an interest in a resource that cannot be satisfied for both through the utiliza-
tion of the resource. On the right part of Figure 1 we see that agents acting selfishly can 
lead to new tussles (spill-over) that may involve new stakeholders as well. For example, 
the Tussle I among Actor A and Actor B may trigger the Tussle II involving the same 
stakeholders, or a Tussle III among Actor B and Actor C. This basic model is extended 
to identify abstract tussle patterns that can be used to identify and analyze a broad range 
of tussles from the desired topic space. Each tussle pattern identifies agents, their inter-
ests in resources and how conflicts of interests emerge between actors. Each tussle pat-
tern has distinctive characteristics that make them difficult to resolve.  
Actor?
Resource?
satisfiedBy?
has/asks?
Tussle?
Interest?
affects?
threatens? realisedBy?
participatesIn?
Tussle I?
Actor B?
Actor A?
Tussle III?
Actor C?
participatesIn?
mayTrigger?Tussle II?
participatesIn?
participatesIn?
mayTrigger?
 
Fig. 1. An ontology for socio-economic tussles 
Tussles can be categorized based on their nature as economic and social ones. Eco-
nomic tussles refer to conflicts between stakeholders, motivated from an expected 
reward gained (or cost avoided) when using scarce resources rationally, while social 
tussles refer to conflicts between stakeholders that do not share the same social inter-
ests, or that have repercussions into broader society as a result of changes in the tech-
nical domain. Tussles related to engineering decisions during design-time are out of 
article’s scope, but we argue that most of them have their roots in economic and so-
cial domain. We should note that a single tussle instance could have arisen because a 
set of stakeholders follow economic objectives and their actions affect the social in-
terests of other stakeholders.  
3.1 Tussle Patterns 
We have identified an initial set of four tussle patterns that include contention, repur-
posing, responsibility and control. Figure 2 shows the actors involved in each tussle 
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pattern, and their interests that result in conflict for a set of resources. Dotted arrows 
represent a conflict among two stakeholders, while a dotted rectangle shows the se-
lected set of resources when at least one stakeholder has the ability to influence the 
outcome. Based on the context, a reverse tussle pattern may also be present. The char-
acteristics of each pattern can be seen in many current and future Internet scenarios. 
Each pattern looks at relationships between consumers and suppliers and how con-
flicts of interest can emerge through technical innovations. The dynamics of a rela-
tionship over time is important, as interests, values and technologies change. By clas-
sifying tussle patterns we envisage the provision of a reference point in performing 
the second step of the proposed methodology for identifying and assessing tussles. It 
is important to note that the roles “consumer” and ”provider” are context specific, and 
an individual stakeholder can be a resource consumer in one tussle, but a provider of a 
resource in another.  For instance, while individual Internet users are typically con-
sumers, when they are creating data that a business would like to sell, with or without 
their knowledge and consent, they are ”providers” of the resource in such a scenario. 
The initial set of tussle patterns is described below. 
R1?
Consumer A Consumer B
Interest
Provider X
Interest?
Interest
R1?
Consumer A
Interest Interest
Provider X
Interest?
Consumer A?
Interest
Provider Y?
R2?R1?
Provider X?
Interest?Interest?
Provider?
R2?R1?
Consumer?
Interest?
U(R1,R2) ?
< ?
U(R1,R3)?
R3?
Contention? Responsibility?Repursposing? Control?
Interest?
U(R1,R2)?
> ?
U(R1,R3)?
 
Fig. 2. The Initial Set of Tussle Patterns 
The contention tussle pattern involves two or more consumers (A and B) using a 
single resource R1 from a provider X for the same or different interests. The tussle 
exists either between consumer interests due to the scarcity of resource, or among a 
consumer and the provider due to the impact on a provider’s ability to exploit the 
resource. The role of the consumer may be played by an end-user or even a provider 
that receives services at the wholesale level (we refer to this case as the reverse con-
tention tussle). In the reverse case, two providers may compete for a resource owned 
by a single consumer. Instances of this tussle pattern have their roots in economics 
and thus are typically resolved through the process of economic equilibrium or 
through regulation when an interest becomes a citizen’s right. Examples include cloud 
resources utilization like bandwidth of bottleneck links. If pricing schemes for such 
shared resources are not sensitive to the volume consumed then a “tragedy of the 
commons” can arise. 
In the repurposing tussle pattern, a consumer A wants to use a resource R1 from a 
provider X for an interest not acceptable to X. The tussle exists between consumer 
and provider if A’s new interest utilizes R1 in unforeseen ways that affects X’s ability 
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to deliver R1 sustainably, and/or the value A derives from their new interest fair ex-
ceeds that gained by X. The situation often results in X restricting the capabilities of 
resources. Examples of economic tussles include sharing of copy-righted files (e.g. 
music) and selling of personal information. It is important to note that many innova-
tions in the Internet space have involved repurposing of resources, so identifying this 
sort of tussle also represents a way to find potential areas of growth and innovation. 
In the responsibility pattern, a consumer A uses a resource R1 from provider X and 
resource R2 from provider Y to fulfill an interest that is not acceptable to provider Y. 
The tussle exists between providers as it is not in X’s interest to defend Y’s interests. 
The situation is difficult to resolve as acceptance of responsibility has a cost, which 
when not aligned with a business objective is difficult to incentivise. Example in-
cludes distribution of copy-righted content. 
In the control tussle pattern, a consumer – or provider – X uses a resource R1 but re-
lies on provider Y in order for the service to be completed. Provider Y can use either 
resource R2 or R3, but chooses R2 that is different from the one provider X prefers. 
This tussle pattern arises because each provider makes decisions following different 
policies and is mostly related to economic objectives. An example of such tussles is 
attempts by an ISP to restrict how a consumer uses the resource (e.g. performing deep 
packet inspection and throttling so that quality of other services is acceptable).  
3.2 Economic Tussles 
Economic tussles refer to conflicts between stakeholders, motivated from an expected 
reward gained (or cost avoided) when acting rationally. These tussles are realized by 
taking advantage of imbalanced access to necessary information, or uneven control 
abilities. The latter case stems from protocol features not designed for being used in 
that way, or were intentionally left out of scope. Economic tussles are mostly related 
to the scarcity of certain resources that need to be shared. Furthermore, such tussles 
can occur between collaborating stakeholders due to different policies or, in economic 
terms, different valuations of the outcome. Tussles can also appear when a stake-
holder is being bypassed. 
Contention tussles are usually caused by the existence of scarce resources and can 
be seen as evidence of misalignment between demand and supply in the provisioning 
of services. A popular example is bandwidth of bottleneck links and radio frequencies 
shared between users and wireless devices. In the former case, modern transport con-
trol protocols perform congestion control without considering the utility of the sender 
on instantaneous bandwidth or the number of their active connections. This, together 
with the prevalence of flat pricing schemes, has led to a contention tussle among user 
types, which economists identify as a “tragedy of the commons”. Similar contention 
tussles can take place for other cloud resources as well, such as processing and stor-
age capabilities of servers and networking infrastructure. For example, routing table 
memory of core Internet routers can be considered a “public good” that retail ISPs 
have an incentive to over-consume by performing prefix de-aggregation with Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP). Another type of scarce Internet resources is network identi-
fiers, like IPv4 addresses and especially “Provider Independent” ones that ease net-
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work management and avoid ISP lock-in. Sometimes a contention tussle between 
consumers can have side effects on the owner of the scarce resource, which is an 
economic entity and must protect its investments. Examples include the deployment 
of Deep Packet Inspection techniques by ISPs in order to control how bandwidth is 
allocated across users and services. 
The remaining tussle patterns are mostly seen in bilateral or multilateral transac-
tions where one party has an information advantage over others; a situation known as 
“information asymmetry” in the economic theory literature. This imbalance of power 
can sometimes lead to “market failures”, a case where the final outcome is not prefer-
able by any participant. Two well-known effects of information asymmetry are “ad-
verse selection” and “moral hazard”.  
Adverse selection arises when several providers offer the same service, with possi-
bly different quality features known only to each seller, and the buyer who seeks a 
high-quality service is prepared to pay on average less than the price he would be 
willing to pay if he could infer the quality of all candidates and select the most suit-
able one. But, this lower price would lead some sellers of higher quality services to 
stop selling (since they do not cover their costs anymore) and thus, in the long term, 
only low quality services will be available. Similarly, if a service provider were the 
less informed party, then setting - for example - a low price would increase his risk of 
being selected by the least profitable customers. This would increase his costs and 
trigger a rise in prices, making this service less attractive to a number of profitable 
customers. Eventually this “adverse selection spiral” might, in theory, lead to the 
collapse of the market. The repurposing tussle pattern described above can be associ-
ated with the adverse selection issue. 
Moral hazard can occur when one party of the transaction cannot (or it is very 
costly to) infer the actions of the other one and thus the latter one may have the incen-
tive to behave inappropriately. Responsibility tussles are related to moral hazard and 
usually arise when a service contract term is violated and the consumer has economic 
transactions with multiple providers. This is the case when a set of providers collabo-
rate during service provision with strict requirements, like long-distance phone con-
versations taking place over Internet. Each provider has partial private information 
about the problem and no one is willing to take responsibility and the resulting cost. 
Furthermore, this type of tussle can occur as a side effect to a contention tussle. In the 
example of file sharing applications, if an ISP deployed middle-boxes and performed 
traffic shaping then it may have negative impact on the services, and thus, on the 
viability of new ASPs, who however cannot safely attribute these effects to the ISP. 
Closely related to moral hazard is the “principal-agent problem”, where one party - 
the principal – delegates control to the agent, but their interests are not aligned and thus 
the latter has the ability and incentive to shirk. The control tussle pattern is a principal-
agent type of problem, observed when the involved parties have a customer-provider 
relationship or, in general, when a contract outlines their obligations. For example, con-
trol tussles can appear when a pair of entities makes decisions following different poli-
cies and conflicting objectives. Examples of such tussles include different policies on 
routing decisions, for example ISPs selecting the next hop of user traffic while users 
selecting the traffic source in their requests. In the former case, a provider may seek 
redundancy and reliability asking for a backup path towards a destination, or prefer 
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avoiding specific upstream ISPs. In the latter case, when multiple candidate servers are 
available, a consumer may prefer the one offering better QoS, while a provider selects 
the server that minimizes its cost; e.g., this is possible if the provider operates a local 
DNS service. However, the control pattern includes also cases where there is no contract 
between the participants and these may have conflicting interests on the possible out-
comes. In this last case, information about each other’s preferences, possible actions and 
ability to observe past actions can have significant effect on the outcome, as is the case 
with the “prisoner’s dilemma” game theoretic problem. 
Researchers have proposed several methods in order to deal with the above issues. 
For example, incentive schemes like reputation systems and penalties to promote 
effort and care are suggested as a countermeasure for moral hazard issues. Similarly, 
the proposed way for mitigating the effects of adverse selection is for the less in-
formed party to gather more information (called “signaling”) and select candidate 
transaction partners (called “screening”) by using, for example, auctions. 
3.3 Social Tussles 
What does SESERV mean when discussing social tussles? At the most basic level, 
these tussles represent issues that arise as a result of a disconnect between the techni-
cal affordances of the network and the interests of regulators, business and individuals 
at the micro level and societal values and social goods at the macro level. SESERV 
can identify social tussles that arise as a result of how individuals interact with each 
other and with technology, based on their roles, identities, and psychology. 
Repurposing tussles occur in regards to the privacy of user communication data be-
tween users, ISPs, service providers and regulators. The users are social actors who 
have a desire, generally speaking, that networks are trustworthy and private [2]. The 
privacy of communications is based on democratic ideals, that persons should be 
secure from unwarranted surveillance. However, the issue turns into a tussle over the 
very definition of what constitutes unwarranted surveillance, and when surveillance 
may be warranted in ways that individual users are willing to forego their privacy 
concerns in the interest of broader societal concerns. Governments frequently argue 
that in order to protect national security, they must be given access to network com-
munication data. Furthermore, ISPs and other companies such as Google and Amazon 
have increasingly been able to monetize their user transaction data and personal data. 
Google is able to feed advertisements based on past searching and browsing habits, 
and Amazon is able to make recommendations based on viewing and purchasing 
habits. These applications of user data as marketing tools are largely unregulated. And 
in many cases, users have proved willing to give up some of their privacy in exchange 
for the economic benefit of better deals that can come from targeted advertising.  
However, for users who wish to opt out of such systems, the mechanisms for doing so 
are often less than clear, since the owners of the system prefer to keep people in, 
rather than easily let them out. 
Responsibility tussles occur with ISPs that often inhabit a middle ground – they are 
the bodies with direct access to the data, but are simply businesses, trying to make a 
profit. ISPs, however, are often placed in the uncomfortable position of trying to negoti-
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ate a balance between their users’ expectations of privacy (which, if breached, could 
cause them to take their business elsewhere), the potential profits to be made from 
monitoring and monetizing the communication of their users, and the demands of gov-
ernment bodies to be able to monitor the networks for illegal or unwanted activities.   
Control tussles in a social context relate, for instance, to digital citizenship and un-
derstanding the balance between individual and corporate rights and responsibilities, 
and how such a balance can be achieved through accountability and enforceable con-
sequences (e.g. loss of privileges). This is a difficult issue, which must be debated and 
resolved in the real world by policy makers and legal experts. However, these proc-
esses tend to be slow to deal with change, particularly when compared to the speed of 
change in many technological systems such as the Future Internet. In practice, tech-
nology that upsets the balance of control is often released and the debates over control 
and resulting policy changes follow. In some ways, new technology that unbalances 
existing systems of control can be the impetus and focus of debates that would other-
wise be quite dry and difficult to interest politicians and citizens in. This is a very 
tough problem and relates to those promoting principles of open society and those 
wishing to maintain confidential communication.  
For instance, is Wikileaks right or wrong to distribute leaked documents containing 
the details of government and corporate communications? Until Wikileaks started re-
leasing real documents of widespread interest, few people were interested in debating 
the societal risks and values surrounding a platform that could potentially distribute 
previously secret documents. However, once Wikileaks began distributing documents, 
millions of people worldwide began to debate these very issues in the media, in seats of 
government and power, and at the dinner table. Suddenly, questions regarding whether 
Wikileaks should do this, whether governments and businesses had the right to censor 
or attack them for doing so, and what role ISPs and service providers such as PayPal 
have in supplying services to controversial online bodies come to the forefront. If 
Wikileaks is wrong, what sanctions would be appropriate, and what technical designs 
would be appropriate to implement them? Conversely, if Wikileaks is right, what tech-
nical designs can protect such sites from being attacked by entities inconvenienced or 
embarrassed by their revelations? The Internet makes this a particularly contentious 
issue because with the global nature of the Internet one can't just assume Western values 
(as if it were possible even within Europe to agree to what that means). Where does 
national sovereignty fit into all of this? Such a tussle of control would need to be as-
sessed by philosophers and politicians as well as security and trust experts. 
4 Survey of Work on Social and Economic Tussles as 
Highlighted in FP7 Projects 
In this section, SESERV looks at specific projects in the FP7 Future Networks project 
portfolio, and discuss the socio-economic tussles related to them.   
The Trilogy project [16] studied extensively the contention tussle among users as 
well as among an ISP and its customers, due to the aggressive behavior of popular 
file-sharing applications. On the one hand it proposed two protocols and a novel con-
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gestion control algorithm that gives the right incentives to users of bandwidth inten-
sive applications. Re-ECN protocol makes senders accountable for the congestion 
they cause. It requires a sender to inform the network about the congestion that each 
packet is expected to cause; otherwise the packet will be dropped with high probabil-
ity before reaching its destination. MPTCP is a new multi-path transport protocol that 
carefully couples the congestion control of multiple sub-paths so that ISPs’ resources 
are shared between users in a fairer manner. This is achieved by configuring MPTCP 
so that it acts less aggressively than TCP when the latter flows experience congestion 
and more aggressively otherwise. Furthermore, the adoption of several protocols (i.e. 
MPTCP, LISP) and pricing schemes (based on traffic volume and congestion volume) 
has been studied as a control tussle among providers.  
The Trilogy project also studied the social tussles surrounding “phishing”, the at-
tempt to acquire sensitive personal data of end-users by masquerading as a trustwor-
thy entity, as a reverse contention tussle among two website owners (the ”consum-
ers”). The tussle is being played out in the routing domain: the fraudulent one adver-
tises more specific BGP prefixes so that ISPs update the entries in their routing tables 
(the resource) and route end-user requests to the fake website instead of the real one. 
This situation has been shown to be a real problem due to the incentives of ISPs to 
increase their revenues by attracting traffic, but no mechanism has been suggested to 
deal with this security problem and the fears that it raises among end-users.  There is a 
special social concern regarding vulnerable populations such as the elderly, who are 
often considered to be easy targets for such “phishing” attempts. 
The ETICS project (Economics and Technologies for Inter-Carrier Services) [8] 
studies a repurposing tussle arising when an ISP (the “provider”) requests a share of 
an ASP’s revenues (the “consumer”) due to its higher investment risks and opera-
tional costs. ETICS proposes technical solutions and economic mechanisms that will 
allow network providers to offer inter-domain QoS assurance and obtain higher bar-
gaining power during negotiations for service terms (e.g. pricing). The need for col-
laboration among ISPs gives rise to a control tussle and a responsibility tussle in case 
of contract term violation. 
The SmoothIT project (Simple Economic Management Approaches of Overlay 
Traffic in Heterogeneous Internet Topologies) studies the control tussle that arises 
between ISPs and ASPs with respect to the routing decisions of each party. An ASP 
or peer-to-peer (P2P) application may employ advanced probing techniques for esti-
mating the performance on each path and select the path (or destination) that maxi-
mizes its utility. At the same time an ISP performs traffic engineering without being 
able to predict how ASPs will react. This results to an endless loop of selfish actions 
that increases the cost of ISPs and limits performance gains of ASPs. To this end, an 
incentive-based approach was developed, referred to as the Economic Traffic Man-
agement (ETM). ETM offers better coordination among the aforementioned players 
that is mutually beneficial [15].  
The development and investigation of In-Network Management mechanisms was a 
novel paradigm to manage networks according to the 4WARD project [1]. Since it is 
based on a lean architecture to operate new services in the Future Internet, the discovery 
of capabilities and the adaptation of many management operations to current working 
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conditions of a network are major elements in the new approach. Thus, a control tussle 
arises, where embedded capabilities of networking devices and elements see “default-
on” management functionality, which consist out of autonomous components interact-
ing with each other in the same device and with components in neighboring devices. 
This requires device vendors to change their management model and ISPs to enable 
respective embedded management functionality within their networks. 
The MOBITHIN project [13] is related to a responsibility tussle between users of 
wireless services, mobile operators and regulators that has arisen from the social in-
terest to reducing carbon footprint of the ICT sector and the economic incentive to 
minimize costs. The regulator (who is in charge of allocating and administering how 
spectrum is being utilized and thus can be seen as “Provider Y” in Figure 2) is trying 
to place limits on energy consumption of both consumers and providers and may 
introduce penalty fees to those that don’t use efficient technologies. Due to economies 
of scale the thin-client paradigm, where most applications run on a remote server, is 
considered to achieving energy savings but to the disadvantage of the server provider. 
However under some assumptions, WiFi hotspots can consume much less energy than 
UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications System) networks. Thus, responsibil-
ity cannot be easily checked. Furthermore, this situation triggers a control tussle be-
tween wireless network operators and users of dual-band devices (e.g. WiFi and 
UMTS) on the technology used to communicate. Next generation networks, where a 
provider can control which access technology is used by its end-users, could affect the 
user’s ability to derive maximum value from the service. 
The SENDORA project [14] identifies a contention tussle based on their own eco-
system design for Sensor Network aided Cognitive Radio technology that utilizes 
wireless sensor networks to support the coexistence of licensed and unlicensed wire-
less users in an area. In this case, the spectrum is the resource in contention and the 
“provider” is the regulator, which is not the owner but the administrator of the re-
source. Existing mobile operators, TV broadcasters and new operators are the ”con-
sumers” of the resource in contention. The latter is looking to have a slice of the re-
source in order to develop business whilst the former two are at once trying to block 
the entry of new entrants to the market and minimize any impact on their existing 
business. The solution proposed by SENDORA is to build this tussle into their busi-
ness ecosystem and to design benefits for the incumbent resource consumers (e.g. 
mobile operators and TV broadcasters) such as reduced operating costs, superior 
technology and potentially lucrative spectrum trading. Furthermore, there is a repur-
posing tussle between a regulator for anti-competitive tactics and the provider. The 
spectrum can be used for providing a service as well as a barrier-to-entry which is in 
conflict with the regulator’s interest for preventing monopolies. 
These are just a few examples among the many tussles that exist or potentially ex-
ist as a result of technological changes and innovations being researched to advance 
the Future Internet. One challenge for the technologists designing new hardware, 
software, systems, and platforms, however, is to be aware that technology is not 
value-free, since it can have several consequences. To some extent, this message has 
already been taken on board by many policy makers, computer scientists, and systems 
designers.  The recognition that technology-in-use frequently differs from technology-
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during-design is growing. Thus technology will have socio-economic consequences 
when released, and the challenge is to take steps to anticipate those consequences 
where possible, to identify unanticipated emergent consequences as they arise, and to 
learn the lessons of previous tussle negotiations and resolutions to smooth the imple-
mentation of future designs.  
5 Conclusions and Future Work 
The SESERV Coordination and Support Action was designed to help fill the gap be-
tween socio-economic priorities and the Future Internet research community by offering 
selected services to FP7 projects in Challenge 1. SESERV provides access to socioeco-
nomic experts investigating the relationship between FI technology, society, and the 
economy through white papers, workshops, FIA sessions, and research consultancy.  
In this paper SESERV proposes a methodology for identifying and assessing tus-
sles that are present in the Internet, or may arise after a protocol or service has been 
introduced. Although the suitability of such a methodology cannot be easily quanti-
fied, we believe it can capture the evolving relationships among stakeholders, and 
thus tussles, across time. Furthermore, we provide a taxonomy of economic and social 
tussles linked to a number of identified patterns and give examples of such tussles and 
how these are studied by several European research projects under FP7. The tussle 
analysis methodology will be evaluated in the context and work of other FP7 projects 
during the lifetime of the project, and will be enriched and complemented by other 
techniques; thus forming a toolbox of approaches to understanding the socio-
economic issues inherent in FP7 FI projects. This toolbox will be further enhanced 
and finalized after the workshops, sessions, and consultations, as the project empiri-
cally identifies socio-economic issues arising from FP7 and links those to socio-
economic tools and methods for analyzing and resolving these issues. 
Even though the SESERV project is at its initial phase SESERV can state prelimi-
nary observations on whether and the extent to which socio-economic issues are being 
addressed by the FP7 Future Network project portfolio. At this early stage, SESERV 
noticed that a significant number of research projects show a major technical view-
point. For example, MIMAX, EUWB, FUTON, and WIMAGIC try to design techni-
cal solutions that achieve efficient spectrum usage for mobile devices. Following the 
increasing consensus on benefits of incorporating economic incentive mechanisms in 
technical solutions, several projects like Trilogy, SmoothIT, ETICS, and PURSUIT 
follow a techno-economic approach. However, SESERV feels that less focus has been 
given on the interplay of technical, social, and economic objectives. This could be 
attributed to the difficulty in setting up such a multi-disciplinary team in order to 
apply a holistic approach, when making technology decisions and/or the inherent 
difficulty of addressing socioeconomic issues in the Internet when such challenges 
still exist in the real world. 
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